thestrategicdialogues.com Report : Visit Site

Technical data of the thestrategicdialogues.com

Geo IP provides you such as latitude, longitude and ISP (Internet Service Provider) etc. informations. Our GeoIP service found where is host thestrategicdialogues.com. Currently, hosted in United States and its service provider is Automattic Inc .

HTTP Header Analysis

HTTP Header information is a part of HTTP protocol that a user's browser sends to called nginx containing the details of what the browser wants and will accept back from the web server.

DNS

HtmlToText

strategic dialogues on geopolitics, security and strategy search main menu skip to primary content skip to secondary content home china and the pacific geopolitics and strategic impulses maritime security non-state actors nuclear issues south asia energy security guest contributions media and upcoming appearances about this site post navigation ← older posts the dilemma of a threshold posted on august 4, 2018 by strategicdialogues 1 in nuclear policy parlance, ‘threshold’ indicates when and under what conditions leadership may resort to the use of nuclear weapons by vice admiral (retd.) vijay shankar the nuclear planner is acutely involved in analysis of when and under what political conditions opposing leadership (military or otherwise) may resort to the employment of nuclear weapons. for nations with a policy of no-first-use (nfu), the answer is “in response to the first-use (fu) of a nuclear weapon under conditions as stipulated in the doctrine.” however between nuclear armed nations, the one with a fu policy is faced with a more complex set of issues which will invariably raise the question “are political ends served with first-use of nuclear weapons knowing that an escalatory response may well be massive and place value targets in its cross hair.” does first-strike come paired with the ability to offset a nuclear response? indeed there is the theoretical possibility that the first strike may altogether neutralise the opposition’s capability of nuclear response; but this, as the evolution of nuclear thought and development of nuclear arsenals have shown, is a fantasy. even the smallest retaliation in a nuclear exchange targeting a city will imply horrific destruction that the first striker must contend with. to put matters in perspective consider the following: the destructive potential of a nuclear weapon say a 20 kiloton nuclear weapon airburst targeting a city such as karachi or a comparable city such as mumbai, (in 2017 karachi’s metropolitan area population was estimated at 23 million) with a population density of 24,000 per square kilometre will result in at least 8,00,000 primary casualties and another 12,00,000 secondary (statistics approximate based on casualty curves, abraham henry, nuclear weapons and war, 1984 ). or, one only has to recall the geographic extent and casualties of the 1986 “chernobyl” power plant disaster to appreciate that the hazards of a nuclear encounter are not abstract notions. the radiation fallout spread from scandinavia to the black sea, over 116,000 people were affected while belarus has since shown a 2400% annual increase in the incidents of thyroid cancer. the capability to respond unfailingly and credibly lies at the heart of a deterrent strategy driven by a nfu policy. faced with the certainty of appalling destruction in response to a nuclear adventure, why an aggressor should contemplate a first-use of nuclear weapons remains bizarre since it is at odds with the very idea of survival. whatever may be the conditions of the conflict; the approach of such a threshold when one or the other protagonist may reach for the nuclear trigger must not only be transparent but be declared so that a return to normalcy becomes viable. the strategic irony of dealing with pakistan is that not only is it armed with nuclear weapons, but also forewarns ‘first-use’ shorn of a declared doctrine. the weapon, as recent statements from their establishment suggest, is “india specific” and the development of their nuclear arsenal is to deter india’s conventional forces from offensive operations through the use of tactical nuclear weapons (!) and should that elicit a massive response then that would be countered by an assured “limited” (?) second strike capability (in conversation with khalid kidwai, 2015). the latter, in their view, serves to “stabilise” the former; never you mind what or who caused the primary provocation. the doctrine remains under a cloak of ambiguity emboldened by the belief in a sea-based second strike launched from conventional submarines. the first deduction that may be made from such a doctrine is that pakistan has adopted a nuclear war-fighting doctrine notwithstanding a dangerous technology handicap necessary to provide intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (isr) and command and control on land, at sea and in the air. the second deduction is, between their first and second strike pakistan is convinced of surviving massive retaliation with its second strike intact. is this a reasonable assumption or is it more bravado than sense? the third understanding is, when such a nuclear doctrine remains cloaked in ambiguity the separation between the nuclear and principles that govern conventional warfare are blurred. this attains a catastrophic bent significantly when conventional principles such as surprise and deception are integrated into a first or a second strike plan, for the unsaid implication is that pakistan, in some woolly manner, holds sway over the escalatory dynamic. in all this what alarms is the lowering of the nuclear threshold while exposing the weapon to unintended use in its movement into the tactical battle area and the near total breakdown of centralised command and control. also, the deterrent value of the weapon from the standpoint of both time and space is narrowed if not foreclosed. two more issues need to be recognised relating to the vexed geography of the indo-pak situation; the line of control (loc) demarcates extent of geographic control over disputed territory in jammu and kashmir, to advocate creating a nuclear wasteland in territorial hankerings does not quite make strategic sense. it is equally clear that, among nations that share common borders, a nuclear exchange will spread devastation irrespective of man-made boundaries. in the early stages of pakistan weaponizing its nuclear capability it had, indeed, gestured to where its nuclear threshold lay. as could be deciphered, first-use of nuclear weapons was predicated on four thresholds: large territorial setbacks, comprehensive military attrition, economic collapse and political precariousness. the deterrent logic these thresholds described was really quite unmistakeable for they also provided to pakistan a context for maintaining conventional power. however, this rationality flew in the face of the acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons (tnws). the perception widely held among commentators in india is that the four threshold doctrine has since been trashed. “full-spectrum deterrence” is what pakistan today makes its arsenal out to be. central to this doctrine is the integration of tnws with conventional forces and a callow belief that the nuclear escalatory ladder is in control of the first striker. this abstruse doctrinal tangle suggests that pakistan not only fails to take account of india’s nuclear response but is also convinced of their ability to initiate a nuclear war and survive unscathed from the encounter. to establish where pakistan’s nuclear threshold lies conceptually is a baffling task. however, for pakistan to escalate to the nuclear dimension in response to an indian conventional riposte to a major terror assault traced to ghq rawalpindi cannot be consistent with their “full spectrum” doctrine since the riposte does not come as a result of the latters failed conventional action which is the “first tier” of the spectrum. rather, in this frame of reference, the nuclear first-use threshold must be assessed in the context of political realities, state policy that finds unity with jihadists and military capability. an ambiguous nuclear doctrine in these circumstances cannot alone determine the nuclear threshold; what it can do is calibrate the uncertainty that it imposes and in the process limit both extent and intensity of the riposte. nuclear thresholds are neither fixed by geography nor by time but determined more by severity and purpose of military action, which by some national gauge or a combination of trigg

URL analysis for thestrategicdialogues.com

https://thestrategicdialogues.com/category/south-asia/
https://thestrategicdialogues.com/category/geopolitics-and-strategic-impulses/
https://thestrategicdialogues.com/#secondary
https://thestrategicdialogues.com/page/2/
https://thestrategicdialogues.com/2018/04/30/the-regression-of-nuclear-policy/#comments
https://thestrategicdialogues.com/2018/08/04/the-dilemma-of-a-threshold/
https://thestrategicdialogues.com/2018/04/30/the-regression-of-nuclear-policy/
https://thestrategicdialogues.com/author/strategicdialogues/
https://thestrategicdialogues.com/2018/08/04/the-dilemma-of-a-threshold/#comments
https://thestrategicdialogues.com/category/non-state-actors/
https://thestrategicdialogues.com/category/nuclear-issues/
https://thestrategicdialogues.com/category/energy-security/
https://thestrategicdialogues.com/category/guest-contributions/
https://thestrategicdialogues.com/about/
https://thestrategicdialogues.com/#content

Whois Information

Whois is a protocol that is access to registering information. You can reach when the website was registered, when it will be expire, what is contact details of the site with the following informations. In a nutshell, it includes these informations;

Domain Name: THESTRATEGICDIALOGUES.COM
Registry Domain ID: 1738617755_DOMAIN_COM-VRSN
Registrar WHOIS Server: whois.wildwestdomains.com
Registrar URL: http://www.wildwestdomains.com
Updated Date: 2018-07-13T08:32:33Z
Creation Date: 2012-08-13T05:04:38Z
Registry Expiry Date: 2019-08-13T05:04:38Z
Registrar: Wild West Domains, LLC
Registrar IANA ID: 440
Registrar Abuse Contact Email: [email protected]
Registrar Abuse Contact Phone: 480-624-2505
Domain Status: clientDeleteProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientDeleteProhibited
Domain Status: clientRenewProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientRenewProhibited
Domain Status: clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
Domain Status: clientUpdateProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientUpdateProhibited
Name Server: NS1.WORDPRESS.COM
Name Server: NS2.WORDPRESS.COM
DNSSEC: unsigned
URL of the ICANN Whois Inaccuracy Complaint Form: https://www.icann.org/wicf/
>>> Last update of whois database: 2018-08-22T07:21:24Z <<<

For more information on Whois status codes, please visit https://icann.org/epp

NOTICE: The expiration date displayed in this record is the date the
registrar's sponsorship of the domain name registration in the registry is
currently set to expire. This date does not necessarily reflect the expiration
date of the domain name registrant's agreement with the sponsoring
registrar. Users may consult the sponsoring registrar's Whois database to
view the registrar's reported date of expiration for this registration.

TERMS OF USE: You are not authorized to access or query our Whois
database through the use of electronic processes that are high-volume and
automated except as reasonably necessary to register domain names or
modify existing registrations; the Data in VeriSign Global Registry
Services' ("VeriSign") Whois database is provided by VeriSign for
information purposes only, and to assist persons in obtaining information
about or related to a domain name registration record. VeriSign does not
guarantee its accuracy. By submitting a Whois query, you agree to abide
by the following terms of use: You agree that you may use this Data only
for lawful purposes and that under no circumstances will you use this Data
to: (1) allow, enable, or otherwise support the transmission of mass
unsolicited, commercial advertising or solicitations via e-mail, telephone,
or facsimile; or (2) enable high volume, automated, electronic processes
that apply to VeriSign (or its computer systems). The compilation,
repackaging, dissemination or other use of this Data is expressly
prohibited without the prior written consent of VeriSign. You agree not to
use electronic processes that are automated and high-volume to access or
query the Whois database except as reasonably necessary to register
domain names or modify existing registrations. VeriSign reserves the right
to restrict your access to the Whois database in its sole discretion to ensure
operational stability. VeriSign may restrict or terminate your access to the
Whois database for failure to abide by these terms of use. VeriSign
reserves the right to modify these terms at any time.

The Registry database contains ONLY .COM, .NET, .EDU domains and
Registrars.

  REGISTRAR Wild West Domains, LLC

SERVERS

  SERVER com.whois-servers.net

  ARGS domain =thestrategicdialogues.com

  PORT 43

  TYPE domain

DOMAIN

  NAME thestrategicdialogues.com

  CHANGED 2018-07-13

  CREATED 2012-08-13

STATUS
clientDeleteProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientDeleteProhibited
clientRenewProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientRenewProhibited
clientTransferProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientTransferProhibited
clientUpdateProhibited https://icann.org/epp#clientUpdateProhibited

NSERVER

  NS1.WORDPRESS.COM 198.181.116.9

  NS2.WORDPRESS.COM 198.181.117.9

  REGISTERED yes

Mistakes

The following list shows you to spelling mistakes possible of the internet users for the website searched .